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COMMENTS
REDEMPTION OF AN INTEREST IN REAL ESTATE
Every one understands that under the Statutes of Indiana
when real estate is sold by the sheriff on execution or decretal
order, there is a right of redemption. Our redemption statute,
however, reads "real estate or interest therein." (Burns' Indiana
Statutes 1926, sec. 832.) While the right of redemption is
founded on equitable principles, the right itself is dependent
upon the statutes of each state. Some states have broader stat-
utes than Indiana, while others do not allow redemption.
The investigation resulting in the material of this article
arose out of the following circumstances. The Lawrence
Petroleum Company, a Delaware corporation, owned and
operated some oil leases in Daviess County, Indiana. Its
creditors ified an attachment suit in the Daviess Circuit Court,
and its properties, including pumps, pipes, wells and leases, were
sold by the sheriff of Daviess County to Harts. Within one
year from the date of that sale, receivers were appointed by
the District Court of the United States at Indianapolis. The
receivers tendered to the Harts the full amount required for
redemption, but redemption was refused, primarily on the
ground that the sale by the sheriff of Daviess County was not
one within our redemption statutes.
Thereupon, the receivers filed, in the District Court of the
United States at Evansville, Indiana, a suit in the nature of a
bill to enforce redemption, being Lawrence Petroleum Company,
by its receivers, v. Hart et al., No. 39 In Equity. There were
other theories mentioned in the bill, but all parties and the
court treated the case as involving the single question of re-
demption. The right of redemption was sustained, but the
learned Judge did not render a written opinion. As the case is
novel, though apparently well supported in principle, I feel the
legal profession might be interested in the authorities and rea-
soning sustaining this decision, as no pat case could be found in
any American report.
Section 832, Burns' Indiana Statutes 1926, provides, "The
real estate or any interest therein, sold as aforesaid, or any
part thereof separately sold may be redeemed . . ." The
first problem is to find to what "sold as aforesaid" refers. This
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is made difficult for reasons set forth in footnote1 but, un-
doubtedly, means sold by the sheriff on execution or decretal
order.
The main contention of the defendants was that all the prop-
erty sold was personal property and, therefore, not within the
redemption statutes. Probably all the property sold was per-
sonal property, but that is not reaching the question of whether
it was an interest in real estate. At common law, interests in
real estate less than life estates were chattel interests. There
are numerous instances of chattels real. An ordinary lease of
real estate for a term of years is personal property, but is it not
also an interest in real estate? A number of our states in their
redemption statutes specifically provide there shall be no re-
demption from a lease for a term of less than two years.
Our.Supreme Court has said:2
"A 'Chattel real' at common law was an interest annexed to, or grow-
ing out of, real estate, as a term for years, having the character of im-
mobility, which denominated them real, whilst other chattels proper are
movable, but they are regarded as personal property, and went to the per-
sonal representative upon death, and not to the heir. Schouler on Per-
sonal Property, Sec. 20. Prior to 1843 a 'term of years' was held to be
personal property, and the subject of sale upon execution issued by a
justice of the peace. Barr v. Doe (1842) 6 Blackf. 335, 38 Am. Dec. 146.
But under Rev. St. 1843, page 454 Sec. 3, and under the present statute
(Burns' Ann. St. 1908 Sec. 635) judgments are liens upon chattels real,
and they are sold as real estate."
Section 816, Burns' Indiana Statutes 1926, provides for the
sale of real estate, including chattels real, requiring sale at the
door of the court house of the county in which they are situated.
1 Sections 831 and 832, Burns Statutes 1926, purport to be from Acts
1881 Special Session, page 240, in force September 19, 1881, and appear
to be Sections 2 and 3 of that Act respectively. The reference, however, is
to the beginning of our Code of Civil Procedure, Section 256, Burns 1926,
et. seq. Undoubtedly, Sections 831 and 832 are Sections 2 and 3 respec-
tively of the Acts 1881 Special Session, page 593 et. seq., and Section 1 is
Section 821, Burns 1926. The present redemption statute was approved
April 11, 1881, and is carried in Burns Indiana Statutes 1926 as Sections
821, 831-841 and 843. Section 13 carried an emergency clause which is
omitted in the Burns revision. The reference to the original Acts at
Sections 831 and 832 should be as at Sections 821 and 843.
2 Comer v. Light, 175 Ind. 367; 93 N. E. 660 at page 663; see also
Sta kberger v. Masteller, 4 Ind. 461; Kohring v. Bowman, 137 N. E. 767 at
page 768.
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The right of an attaching creditor to redeem was sustained
by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in which case the court
said: 3
"But it is not necessary to decide whether the word 'owner' is broad
enough in its significance to include an attaching creditor, because we are
of the opinion that he comes within the descriptive phrase of the statute,
'any person having an interest in any such land.' Interest, in common
speech in connection with land, includes all varieties of titles and rights.
When given its plain and natural meaning it comprehends estates in fee,
for life and for years, mortgages, liens, easements, attachments, and every
kind of claim to land which can form the basis of a property right,"
An oil or gas lease has peculiarities of its own. The courts
speak in various ways concerning its incidents, but ordinarily
an oil lease is a contract between the operator engaged in re-
moving crude oil from the ground and marketing the same, and
the owner of the fee simple of the real estate. The lease gen-
erally provides that drilling shall be begun in a year or'several
years, and that the lease shall last as long as oil shall be found
in paying quantities. A small cash rental is provided until oil
is found and thereafter the oil is divided between the operator
and the fee owner, the latter getting one-eighth to one-sixth,
and, of course, more valuable leases carry a greater price to the
owner or lease-holder. The leases oftentimes purport to be
grants of the oil and gas under a certain described tract, and
also grant to the operator the right to build on certain areas
power plants for pumping, and allow him also to put casings in
the well and remove them, and to lay carrying pipes. Owing
to the fact that oil is in the nature of wild animals, the cases
are not uniform on the question as to whether the execution
of the lease grants any right in the oil underground in its wild
or unpossessed state.
The leases in the instant case had the above incidents, and
though the production was not large, it was sufficient to con-
stitute a paying basis.
The case of Hefler v. Dailey, 28 Ind. Appeals, 555, was one I
hesitated to use in my main brief because of some loose lan-
guage, but when the defendants sought to use it, I replied first
by quoting the headnote:
3 Union Trmst Company v. Reed et. al., 213 Mass. 199; 99 N. E. 1093 at
page 1094.
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"A contract of a landowner, by the terms of which he grants to another
'all the oil and gas in and under' a certain tract of land, and providing
penalties for delay in the drilling of the wells, is an assignable interest in
the land and must be in writing."
Then at page 561 of the opinion:
"The oil and gas in their freb and natural state within the land consti-
tute a part of it, though they be fluent and liable to depart to other land,
there to be taken into possession through wells made for such purpose.
The right to take such minerals from the land constitutes an interest in
the land. The instrument under consideration does not create a mere per-
sonal privilege to take the minerals from the land. It is an exclusive and
assignable interest in land. If with propriety it can be called a license, it
must be a license coupled with an interest in land."
Then at page 562, second paragraph:
"The contract before us cannot be regarded as a lease of land for three
years or less, or as a lease of land ineffectual because of uncertainty or
indefiniteness of duration of term; and occupancy thereunder can not be
regarded as a tenancy from year to year; but the interest granted is prop-
erly to be considered as an interest in land within the meaning of our
statutes."
And finally at page 564 as follows:
"While, for reasons which we have sought to state, we do not regard
the contract in suit, as a grant of land, or as a lease properly so called, but
do regard it as a grant of a right in the nature of an incorporeal heredita-
ment, operative from the time of its execution and during the accomplish-
ment of its purpose as a transfer of an exclusive right to search for, take
and appropriate the minerals mentioned- in the instrument, under whatever
technical common law term it may most properly be classed, it must be held
to be a conveyance of an interest in land within the meaning of our stat-
utes."
Other cases, considering for their purposes an oil and gas
lease as an interest in real estate, are set forth in the footnote.4
In the case of Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 35 Supreme Ct.
526 at page 530, the Supreme Court of the United States spoke
of an oil lease as a "vested freehold right".
The nearest Indiana case we could find was Johuson v. Sidey,
59 Ind. App. 678, 109 N. E. 934. In that case the county treas-
4 Ramage v. Wilson, 37 Ind. App. 532, 537, 538; Central Fuel Company
v. Wallace, 174 Ind. 721, 93 N. E. 65, 66; Kahle et. al. v. Crown Oil Co., 180
Ind. 131, 100 N. E. 681, 686; Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. American Tin
Plate Co., 162 Ind. 393; Rembarger v. Losch, 59 App. 678, 118 N. E. 831,
833; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. at page 190.
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urer of Wells County, Indiana, sold for delinquent taxes to
Sidey, upon the land where situated,
"six oil wells located in the southeast corner of the southwest quarter of the
land described in the lease, together with drive pipes, casing, tubing, rods
and pumping jacks connected with said six wells."
Johnson brought an action to quiet his title against Sidey. It
was the contention of Johnson that the sale of the treasurer
was illegal in that it being a sale of chattels real and real estate
it should have been made at the court house door instead of on
the premises. The Appellate Court, at page 935 of the N. E.
Reporter, after discussing the oil lease, stated:
"As to the legal force and effect of this contract there can, we believe,
be no doubt when there is coupled with its terms the fact that the wells
located thereon became and were at the time of the sale by the county
treasurer producing wells. The contract conveyed an interest in land, and
the court erred in overruling the separate demurrers heretofore mentioned,
for the reason that the paticular wells under the facts of this case, the
wells sold with the machinery attached, must be considered real estate, and
not personal property, and the pleadings show that they were sold as per.
sonal property."
The decision of the court in this case was that, as this prop-
erty had been sold as personal property was required to be sold,
rather than as real estate, the sale was void and the owner of
the leases was entitled to have his title quieted as against the
purchaser from the treasurer.
It seems, therefore, well established that a producing oil and
gas lease is an interest in real estate, and we needed only the
decision of the court that an oil and gas lease was an interest
in real estate within our redemption statute.
There remained the further question of our right to redeem
from the sale of the other property used in operating the leases
such as casing, power plants, pumps, etc. The case of Hyatt
et al. v. Vincennes National Bank, 113 U. S. 408, was relied
upon. In that case the sheriff of Knox County sold, as real
estate and chattels real, property of the lessee of a coal mine
which included
"one engine and boiler and hoisting machine, steam pump, Fairbank's rail-
road scales, wagon scales, four screens, blacksmith's shop, one office build-
ing, one engine-building and dumping house, one stable, one lime-house, two
dwelling-houses, track in coal mine, railroad tracks, switches, and all I6x-
tures belonging to the coal mine on said real estate and leasehold."
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The sale was on an execution against the lessee of the mine
and was sought to be set aside because the property had not
been sold as personal property is required to be sold under the
laws of the State of Indiana. The Supreme Court held that the
sale was properly made as real estate or chattels real at the
door of the court house. At page 416 of the opinion the court
said:
"The interest of the judgment debtors in this case in the land covered
by the Bunting agreement was a chattel real; and as the dispute here
relates to machinery, buildings, fixtures and improvements situated on the
Bunting premises, and held under the Bunting agreement, it follows that
that property had impressed on it, by the statute, for the purpose of a sale
on execution, the character of a chattel real, and became, for those pur-
poses, real estate, and, therefore, was not required to be sold as personal
property, present and subject to the view of those attending the sale, but
was properly sold as real estate, at the door of the county court house.
"The estate for years, or the interest in the land, could not be subject
to view. The machinery, buildings, fixtures and improvements were created
under the privilege given by the agreement to occupy the land with con-
structions and buildings for mining coal and other minerals, and, although
Helphenstine & Company had the right to remove the buildings and fixtures
at the expiration of the agreement, yet, so long as they were held under the
agreement, on the premises, and were of the character referred to, they
followed the term for years and partook of its character."
And at page 417 the court said:
"The motion made in the Circuit Court to modify the decree was based
on the idea, that, while the term for years might be a chattel real, the
machinery, buildings, fixtures, and improvements placed on the land should
have been sold as personal property. As the statute requires that real
estate 'shall' be sold at the door of the court house, the visible property
could not be sold there in view of the persons attending the sale of the
real estate, unless it was first severed from the land; and to have so treated
it would, doubtless, have rendered not only it but the term of years worth-
less, as vendible articles. No such result could have been contemplated by
the law makers, and none such can be allowed, if another reasonable and
consistent construction is to be found."
The court enforced the right of the receivers to redeem the
whole property. The Harts received the full amount of their
purchase price with interest, and accounted to the receivers for
all profits realized from operations, they being in possession
until the termination of the trial.
MILTON W. MANGUS.
Of the IndianagoZis Bar.
